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result of defendant's negligence. Therefore, one may argue
that the door is not firmly closed in Maryland to recovery
for mental anguish alone, where such disturbance is prolonged and amounts to a substantial injury in a medical
sense.
WILLIAM H. PRICE II

Railroad Rights Of Way -

Types Of Interests Acquired

Maryland and Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v.
Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust Co.'
The plaintiff brought ejectment for recovery of land
used by the defendant as a railroad right of way. The strip
of land in controversy ran through land owned by the
plaintiff, and had been continuously used by the defendant
and its predecessors in title for railroad purposes from
1880 to 1958, at which time the defendant ceased all railroad operations over the land and removed the rails and
ties therefrom. The defendant railroad had no documentary evidence of title, but contended that it had acquired
title in fee simple absolute by adverse possession. The
plaintiff proved a good paper title to the land and contended that the defendant railroad had acquired at most
an easement by prescription in the right of way which
it abandoned by ceasing operations and removing its ties
and rails from the land. The Court of Appeals, affirming
the judgment of the lower court, held that the defendant
had acquired only an easement by prescription, which it
lost by abandonment.
The effect of a railroad's acts of abandonment depend
on the nature of the estate held by the railroad. If the
interest of the railroad is construed to be an easement,
an incorporeal interest, the railroad has only a right to the
use of the land and has no corporeal ownership in the land
itself.2 An easement can be extinguished by abandonment
1224 Md. 34, 166 A. 2d 247 (1960).
ORichfield
Oil Corp. v. Railroad Co., 179 Md. 560, 20 A. 2d 581 (1941) an easement acquired by grant in a right of way held not to give a railroad
the right to prevent servient landowner from laying pipes below the surface. See also Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Breckenridge, 60 N.J.L. 583, 38 A.
740 (1897). In Michigan Central R. Co. v. Garfield Petroleum Corp., 292
Mich. 373, 290 N.W. 833 (1940) an easement acquired .by prescription in a
railroad right of way held not to carry with it any title to minerals under
the surface of the right of way. Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. American
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of the railroad line,3 and the adjoining servient landowner
is revested with an unencumbered fee.4 However, if the
interest of the railroad is construed to be a fee simple
absolute or qualified,5 a corporeal estate, this possessory
interest does not normally go to the adjoining landowner
on relinquishment of the railroad line, but instead remains
Plate Glass Co., 162 Ind. 393, 68 N.E. 1020 (1903) a prescriptive easement
acquired in a railroad right of way does not encompass the right to sink
a gas well on the right of way.
8In the absence of statute, mere nonuser, however long continued,
usually does not constitute abandonment of an easement acquired by
grant or by eminent domain. O'Brien v. Best, 68 Idaho 348, 194 P. 2d 608
(1948); Abens v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 388 Ill. 261,
57 N.E. 2d 883 (1944) ; Hennick v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Go., 364 Mo.
883, 269 S.W. 2d 646 (1954). However, nonuser, if continued for the
period of limitation, will extinguish an easement acquired by prescription.
Brown v. M. E. Church, 37 Md. 108 (1872) (Dictum); Rhodes v. Whitehead, 27 Tex. 304, 84 Am. Dec. (1863). Irrespective of the manner in
which the easement is acquired, or the lapse of time, nonuser coupled with
affirmative acts of a permanent character manifesting an intent to
abandon is evidence from which an abandonment may be properly inferred.
Ma. & Pa. R.R. Co. v. Mer.-Safe, Etc., Co., 224 Md. 34, 39-41, 166 A. 2d 247
(1960). Unless a contrary intention is shown, cessation of railroad operations and removal of rails and ties from the land is consistently recognized
as abandonment of an easement. Ma. & ,Pa. R.R. Co. v. Mer.-Safe, Etc., Co.,
supra; Hagerstown & F. Rwy. Co. v. Grove, 141 Md. 143, 118 A. 167 (1922) ;
Ocean Shore Railroad Company v. Doelger, 179 Cal. App. 2d 222, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 706 (1960); City Motel, Inc. v. State, 75 Nev. 137, 336 P. 2d 375
(1959), amend, den., rehearing den., 75 Nev. 148, 337 P. 2d 273 (1959) ;
Powers v. Coos '.Bay Lumber Co., 200 Ore. 329, 263 P. 2d 913 (1953) ; Lacy
v. East 'Broad Top Railroad & Coal Co., 168 Pa. Super. 351, 77 A. 2d 706
(1951). See also Vogler v. Geiss, 51 Md. 407 (1879) ; 1 M.L.E. 2, Abandonment, § 2. Cessation of use, removal of track and adoption of another
route were held not to manifest a permanent intent to abandon, in light
of additional facts showing that the acts were intended as temporary,
were caused by financial necessity, and that the easement right had great
potential economic value for the railroad. Canton Co. v. Balto. & Ohio
R. Co., 99 Md. 202, 57 A. 637 (1904). See also Green v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 141 Md. 128, 118 A. 127 (1922).
'Fleck v. Universal-Cyclops Steel Corp., 397 Pa. 648, 156 A. 2d 832
(1959), grant by deed construed as conveying an easement and not a
"base fee," i.e., fee simple determinable, and consequently when the railroad abandoned the right of way, the title to such land did not revert
to the original grantor and his successor in title; rather, the abandonment
resulted in an extinguishment of the easement so that the land was owned
in fee simple absolute by the owner of the land on both sides of the right of
way. Oases are collected in 136 A.L.R. 296 (1942) : see also 3 NICHOLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 1950) § 9.36[1].
5
In a technical sense there can be no abandonment of a corporal estate.
It can be lost only by adverse possession or transfer to another. 2 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY (1952) § 8.98. The "abandonment," which occurs when
the estate in the right of way is a determinable fee simple, is an automatic
termination of the estate upon the happening of the stated contingency,
i.e., cessation of use for railroad purposes. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936)
§ 44. The "abandonment" which occurs in a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent is a breach of the stated condition, i.e., cessation of use
for railroad purposes, which does not automatically terminate the estate,
but only makes the estate in the land subject to forfeiture if the holder
of the power of termination chooses to exercise his right of re-entry.
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) § 45. See also Lynch v. Bunting, 42 Del.
171, 29 A. 2d 155 (1942).
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in the railroad 6 or reverts to the original grantor or his
heirs.' In determining the nature of the estate held in land
used as a right of way, one must look to the method of
acquisition by the railroad.
That a railroad corporation may acquire land by acts
of adverse possession or prescription is generally recognized.' Courts, which have considered the question of the
exact nature of the estate taken by a railroad's adverse
occupancy of a right of way, have consistently held, as the
Maryland Court of Appeals ruled in the instant case, that
the railroad acquires only an easement by prescription, at
least in the absence of claim by the railroad under color
of title.9 The principle reason advanced in support of the
view that only an easement by prescription is acquired
is stated by the California Supreme Court:'
6 Where a deed is construed to convey a fee simple absolute, grantors'
heirs at law are not entitled to parcel of land upon abandonment of railroad running across such parcel of land. McCotter v. Barnes, 247 N.C. 480,
101 S.E. 2d 330 (1958). Where by condemnation fee was acquired, and
thereafter land was abandoned for purposes for which it was acquired,
title did not revert to prior landowners. Jackson v. City of Abilene, 281
S.W. 2d 767 (Tex. 1955). A railroad company acquiring title to realty
by warranty deed not limiting the use to be made of the realty, and not
providing for a reversion, took a fee simple title, and realty did not revert
to original grantors or their heirs when the railroad abandoned the use
of realty for railway purposes. Nott v. Beightel, 155 Kan. 94, 122 P. 2d 747
(1942). See also 3 NicHoLs, op. cit. supra, n. 4, § 9.36[4].
7 When a determinable fee in the right of way is terminated the land
reverts to the holder of the possibility of reverter. If the possibility of
reverter is nonassignable within the respective jurisdiction, the right of
way reverts to the person from whom the land was acquired, or his heirs,
whether or not he then owns the adjoining lands. However, if the possibility of reverter is assignable within the respective jurisdiction, it may
have been acquired by a subsequent grantee by express or implied grant
along with a grant of the lands abutting the right of way. If such occurs,
upon termination of the determinable estate in the right of way, the
estate will revert to the owner of adjoining lands. For discussion that
some courts have failed to observe these distinctions, see A.L.R., supra,
n. 4. 3 NicHoLs, op. cit. supra, n. 4, § 9.36[2]; Reno, Alienabilitv and
Transmissibility of Future Intere8ts in Maryland, 2 Md. L. Rev. 89 (1937).
674
C.J.S. 478, Railroads, § 85; 44 Am. Jur. 298, Railroads, § 79.
Contra, Narron v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 122 N.C. 856, 29 S.E. 356
(1898); Connellsville Gas Coal Oo. v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 216 Pa. 309,
65 A. 669 (1907). In North Carolina and Pennsylvania the fact that the
railroad could enter under its power of eminent domain led to the conclusion that it could not acquire title by adverse possession or prescription.
But, in Covert v. Pittsburg & W. Ry. Co., 204 Pa. 341, 54 A. 170 (1903),
a railroad, taking as purchaser under a deed giving color of title, was
permitted to tack its possession and its grantor's possession to make up
the period of limitation to acquire title to the land in fee simple.
9People v. Ocean Shore R.R., 32 Cal. 2d 406, 196 P. 2d 570 (1948) ; Town
of Newcastle v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 155 Ind. 18, 57 N.E. 516 (1900)
Gates v. Colfax Northern Ry. Co., 177 Ia. 690, 159 N.W. 456 (1916)
Michigan Central R. Co. v. Garfield Petroleum Corp., 292 Mich. 373,
290 N.W. 833 (1940) ; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Breckenridge, 60 N.J.L. 583,
38 0A. 740 (1897). For comprehensive discussion, see 127 A.L.R. 517 (1940).
1 People v. Ocean Shore R.R., 32 Cal. 2d 406, 196 P. 2d 570 (1948), cited
by the Maryland Court of Appeals in the instant case.
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"If there is no color of title," and only use and possession of the property, the right acquired depends on12 the
extent and character of the use and possession. If
the sole use is as a right of way, whether as a footpath, wagon road, or railroad, the user will ripen into
an easement, and it is only where there is some additional type of user or other action which will give
notice that the claim is to more than a right of way that
13
the use and permission may ripen into a fee title.'
In the few cases holding that title in fee simple to the
right of way was acquired by adverse possession, it appears
that the railroad claimed under color of title. Thus in
Atchison, T. and S. F. Ry. Co. v. Stamp,'4 defendant
railroad's predecessors in title entered on the land in controversy under a void deed purporting to convey a fee
simple estate and constructed a series of railroad tracks.
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the defendant,
having occupied the land under color of title, had acquired
a fee simple interest by adverse possession.1
1 Defendant railroad in the California case contended that the conveyance of his predecessor in title, which transferred all "right, title and
interest" in the railroad and its properties, was sufficient color of title.
But, the court indicated that the conveyance transferred only what the
grantor actually had, an easement.
12 "The statement occasionally
made that possession under a claim to a
mere easement does not, although continued for the statutory period,
confer title to the fee, involves the misconception that one merely exercising, or undertaking to exercise, an easement in the land, has possession,
or may have possession, of the land. He does not acquire title to the land
by adverse possession for the reason that he never had possession, adverse
or nonadverse." 4 TIFFANY, REAL PRnopE'ry (3d ed. 1939) § 1150; cited
in Ma. & Pa. R.R. Co. v. Mer.-Safe, Etc., Co., 224 Md. 34, 38-39, 166 A.
2d 247 (1960).
People v. Ocean Shore R.R., supra, n. 10, 577. Similarly, the Maryland
Court of Appeals stated in the instant case that: "[T]he character and
extent of the permissible use of an easement acquired by prescription is
commensurate with and determined by the character and extent of the
use during the prescriptive period." Ma. & Pa. R.R. Co. v. Mer.-Safe, Etc.,
Co., supra, n. 12, 38. See also Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. American
Plate Glass Co., 162 Ind. 393, 68 N.E. 1020 (1903) ; Galveston, H. & S. A.
Ry. Co. v. McIver, 245 S.W. 463 (Tex. 1922).
- 290 Ill. 428, 125 N.E. 381 (1919).
'5In Sadler v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 204 Ala. 155, 85 So. 380,
381 (1920), a case involving title to a right of way, it was stated that the
defendant railroad could "acquire title to land by adverse possession,
just as an individual may * * * [D]efendant showed an actual possession
under fence of the right of way for more than [the statutory period of
limitations] . . . under claim of right and color of title by grant and
locaption." Apparently a fencing in of the tract by the railroad, in and of
itself, adds nothing in support to a claim of the fee. Galveston, H. and
S. A. Ry. Co. v. McIver, 245 S.W. 463 (Tex. 1922), held that the railroad had acquired an easement only, "the mere fencing of its right
of way not adding anything to the character of its use and occupancy . ..."
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When the railroad acquires its estate by private grant,
the question of what interest is taken is determined by
reference to the deed of conveyance. 6 The problem is
primarily one of construction and interpretation of the
instrument of conveyance to determine the intent of the
parties as to whether a possessory estate or only an easement was conveyed.' If a deed to a railroad contains
nothing more than a grant of a strip, piece, parcel, or tract
of land, adequately and clearly described, there appears
to be general agreement that a fee simple estate is conveyed. 8 It is also generally held that where a deed contains nothing more than a grant of a right, or grant of a
privilege of constructing, operating, and maintaining a
railroad, or grant of a right of way, an easement is conveyed. 9 Thus, the Maryland Court of Appeals has held
that an easement was conveyed by a deed worded: "grant,
unto [the railroad], its successors and assigns, the rights
of way for railroad purposes in and to the [described tracts
of land]." 2 0
If a deed is not confined in terms either to a grant of
land or right, but also contains other ambiguous proGenerally railroad rights of way are under fence. That it is rarely mentioned in the cases indicates that it is regarded as of little importance
in determination of the issue.
"64 TiFFANY, REAL PROPzRTY (3d ed. 1939) § 977; 3 AmEnIcAx LAW OF
PROPERTY (1952) § 12.89.
1' The general rule of construction has been stated as follows:
"The test by which the doubt in a given case is to be resolved is
the extent of the privilege of use granted and the clearness with which
the space within which those privileges are to be exercised as defined.
Limitations on the privileges granted and lack of clearness in describing the space in which they are to be exercised lead in the direction
of the finding of an easement. Completeness in the uses granted and
clarity and fullness of description lead toward the finding of the
conveyance of a possessory interest."
2 AMEsicAN LAW OF PROPrTY (1952) § 8.21.
18A deed to a railroad company which "granted, bargained, sold, conveyed and confirmed" to the railroad "all that certain lot, piece or parcel
of land . . . bounded and particularly described as follows," conveyed
a fee title. Moakley v. Blog, 90 Cal. App. 96, 265 P. 548 (1928). See also,
Alabama & Vicks'burg Railway Company v. Mashburn, 235 Miss. 346,
109 So. 2d 533 (1959); Mississippi Cent. R. Co. v. Rateliff, 214 Miss. 674,
59 So. 2d 311 (1952); Nystrom v. State, ... S.D ...
, 104 N.W. 2d 711
(1960) ; 132 A.L.R. 142 (1939).
1 Deed providing that grantors "do give, grant, bargain, sell and convey
to the said company the right of way for the use of the said railway over
and across the east half of the northwest quarter" held to convey an
easement. Ingalls v. Byers, 94 Ind. 134 (1883). See also Daugherty v.
Helena & Northwestern Ry., 221 Ark. 101, 252 S.W. 2d 546 (1952) ; Atkin
v. Westfall, 261 Ia. 822, 69 N.W. 2d 523 (1955) ; Hinman v. Barnes, 146
Ohio St. 497, 66 N.E. 2d 911 (1946) ; Lillard v. Southern Railway Company, 330 S.W. 2d 335 (Tenn. 1959); Boles v. Red, 227 S.W. 2d 310
(Tex. 1950); Swan v. O'Leary, 37 Wash. 2d 533, 225 P. 2d 199 (1950).
2Richfield Oil Corp. v. Railroad Co., 179 Md. 560, 565, 20 A. 2d 581 (1941).
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visions, there is considerable conflict among the courts as
to whether such a deed conveys an estate in fee or an
easement.2 1 If any general conclusion can be drawn, there
appears to be a tendency among the courts to construe an
ambiguously worded deed as conveying an easement.
Undoubtedly the long-established policy of most courts to
oppose the separation of small strips of land in fee, plus
the fact that the grants are often made under threat of a
compulsory taking and on a form deed drafted by the railroad, influence the courts' decisions to cut down the nature
of the estate conveyed.12 The Court of Appeals has construed an ambiguously worded deed of a railroad right
of way as conveying only an easement. In Hodges v.
Owings,23 the plaintiff brought an action of ejectment,
contending abandonment of an easement for a railroad
right of way. The language of the deed was not confined
to the conveyance of a specific strip of land adequately
described by metes and bounds, nor did it clearly convey
a right.24 To ascertain the deed's true meaning, the Court
stated that it was proper to inquire into "the situation of
the parties and the circumstances attending the execution
of the deed. ' 25 Accordingly, where it appeared that the
grantor of the deed in question was anxious to have the
railroad built, that the deed was given for only a nominal
"i
The term right of way has two distinct meanings. In legal terms it
means easement, but in railroad parlance and lay speech it means the strip
of land upon which the track is laid. Quinn v. Pere Marguette Ry. Co.,
256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W. 376, 379 (1931). The problem in many instances
is whether to interpret "right of way" for railroad purposes, or words of
similar import as mere words of description, or as words limiting the
grant to an easement.
1 For extended discussion, see Comment, Railroads - Extent of Title
Acquired by Railroad by Adverse Possession of Land Used as Right of
Way - Effect of Mineral Rights, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 297 (1940) ; Comment,
The Real Property Interest Created in a Railroad Upon Acquisition of its
"Right of Way," 27 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 73 (19.54).
- 178 Md. 300, 13 A. 2d 338 (1940).
24Id., 301. The deed provided that, "in consideration that the [railroad company] . . . do locate its Railroad through, in and upon lands
owned by [plaintiff] . . ., and in further consideration of ... one dollar ...,
[plaintiff] . . . doth hereby grant and covenant and agree to convey to
the said [railroad company] . . ., its agents, attorneys, or assigns, a otrip
of land sixty-six feet in width, . . . on each side of the center line of said
railroad as the same shall be finally located . . . together with the right
to divert streams of water for railroad purposes, and to take and use
any stone or timber or other material within the limits of said strip
of land ......
Supra, n. 23, 304. Although it was acknowledged that if the language
of a deed be doubtful it was to be construed most strongly against the
grantor, the court indicated that this rule of construction was to be
resorted to only where all other rules fail to reach the intent of the parties
with reasonable certainty.
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consideration, 2 and that a stipulation in the deed permitted the railroad to divert water and to use building
materials found upon the strip of land conveyed, which
would have been unnecessary if the parties had intended to
convey a fee, the Court concluded that the conveyance
was of an easement for railroad purposes only.
When the right of way is taken under the power of
eminent domain, the nature of the estate appropriated
depends on the statute conferring the power, or on the
powers granted under the corporate charter." The policy
of the courts is to strictly construe the grant of the power
of eminent domain because it is in derogation of private
rights.29 The policy of strict construction is implemented
by the general rule that only such an estate in the property sought to be acquired by eminent domain may be
taken as is reasonably necessary to carry out the function
of the condemner. 0 If the statute or charter expressly
and positively defines the estate to be taken, no other
estate than that prescribed can be seized."' It seems that
it is not necessary for the statute or charter to expressly
state that a fee simple is to be taken, if, by necessary
implication, the intent be clear that a fee simple estate
is to pass on condemnation; 2 but, it is usually held that a
2Other
courts have given some weight to the amount of consideration
paid. If the consideration is nominal, in an otherwise ambiguous deed,
it has some significance in indicating that an easement was conveyed.
New York, B. & E. Ry. Co. v. Motil, 81 Conn. 466, 71 A. 563 (1908);
Rogers v. Pitchford, 181 Ga. 845, 184 S.E. 623 (1936) ; Johnson v. Valdosta,
M. & W. R. Co., 169 Ga. 559, 150 S.E. 845 (192); In re Battelle, 211
Mass. 442, 97 N.E. 1004 (1912).
Supra, n. 23, 304-5.
289 M.L.E. 263, Eminent Domain, § 121; 30 C.J.S. 195-199, Eminent
Domain, § 449.
193 NircHoLs, EMINENT DoMAIN (3d ed. 1950) § 9.2, pp. 164-165:
"[T]he proceeding in eminent domain, which involves the element
of compulsion is in marked contrast to the effect of a voluntary conveyance between individuals. In the later case, whenever it becomes
necessary to construe the instrument of conveyance for the purpose
of determining the extent thereof the rule is that the grantee will be
allowed the greatest interest possible. In eminent domain, however,
that construction must be adopted in the event of uncertainty, indefiniteness or ambiguity as leaves the owner with the greatest possible estate."
Although the analogy to individuals is undoubtedly correct, its applicability in situations involving railroad grantees is doubtful in view of the
policy of many of the courts to construe an ambiguous deed as conveying
only an easement to the grantee railroad.
"0
Cases are collected in 3 NicioLs, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 1950) § 9.2.
" Matter of Water Comr's. of Amsterdam, 96 N.Y. 351 (1884) ; Blondell
v. Guntner, 118 Va. 11, 86 S.E. 897 (1915) ; City of Charlottesville v. Maury,
96 Va. 383, 31 S.E. 520 (1898).
2State
v. State Highway Commission, 163 Kan. 187, 182 P. 2d 127
(1947) ; Valentine v. Lamont, 13 N.J. 569, 100 A. 2d 668 (1953), cert. den.
347 U.S. 966 (1954) ; Jones v. Oklahoma City, 192 Oki. 470, 137 P. 2d 233
(1943) ; Stroud v. State, 38 Tenn. App. 654, 279 S.W. 2d 82 (1955).
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railroad taking land under a statute or charter which does
not clearly authorize it to take a fee, acquires only an
easement.13 However, in Pennsylvania it is held that a
railroad acquires by condemnation a "base fee," 34 which
is defined as something more than an easement, but less
than a fee simple, and which appears to have all the characteristics of a fee simple determinable estate, but only in
the surface of the land and so much beneath as is necessary for support.35 If the charter or statute is permissive
in character, conferring discretion on the company or court
as to whether a fee simple estate or lesser interest is to
be taken, then the nature of the interest taken will depend on the terms of the judgment in the condemnation
proceedings.3 6
In State Roads Comm. v. Johnson,31 a railroad company, defendant's predecessor in title, had acquired land
by condemnation under power of eminent domain. The
plaintiff contended that an easement had been acquired
by the condemnation, and that it was subsequently lost
by abandonment. Since the power to condemn, granted
under the railroad's charter, was permissive in character
and not confined to the taking of an easement, the issue
depended upon the extent of the interest acquired in the
condemnation proceeding. The award of the jury condemned "so much of the land represented as belonging
to the said [owner] * * * as . . . an absolute estate in
perpetuity as is contained within the lines of the annexed
plat * * *."38 The words "an absolute estate in perpetuity"
1 Under a statute authorizing a railroad ,to "purchase or otherwise take
any land" it was held that only an easement for a railroad right of way
was acquired. Agostini v. North Adams Gaslight Co., 265 Mass. 70, 163
N.E. 745 (1928) ; Henry v. Columbus Depot Co., 135 Ohio St. 311, 20 N.E.
2d 921 (1939). See also 155 A.L.R. 381 (1941).
mPennsylvania S. V. R. Co. v. Reading Paper Mills, 149 Pa. St. 18, 24
A. 205 (1892); Reed v. Allegheny County, 330 Pa. 300, 199 A. 187 (1938) ;
Marine Coal Co. v. Pittsburg, M. & Y. R. Co., 246 Pa. 478, 92 A. 688 (1914).
85Reed v. Allegheny County, 330 Pa. 300, 199 A. 187, 189 (1938). In
Brookbank v. Benedum-Trees Oil Company, 389 Pa. 151, 131 A. 2d 103
(1957), a deed which "granted, bargained, sold, released and conveyed
unto the [railroad] ....
a strip of land four rods in width ....
was held
to pass a "base fee," a defeasible fee with right of surface use only and
no mineral rights. Since the deed was construed as having been executed
pursuant to condemnation proceedings it was subject to interpretation only
in this light. See also Lithgow v. Pearson, 25 Colo. App. 70, 135 P. 759
(1913) ; 155 A.L.R. 381, 397 (1941) ; 3 NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed.
1950) § 9.2[3], n. 36.
16Knox v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 157 La. 602, 102 So. 685 (1925);
John T. Moore Planting Co. v. Morgan's Louisiana T. R. & S. S. Co., 126
La. 840, 53 So. 22 (1908) ; Shreveport and R.R. Val. Ry. Co. v. Hinds, 50
La. Ann. 781, 24 So. 287 (1898).
87222 Md. 493, 161 A. 2d 444 (1960).
Id., 497.
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were held to have given the railroad an absolute fee simple
title to the land. Although a condemnation for the purpose of a railroad raises a presumption that the grant is
limited to that use, the Maryland Court of Appeals stated
that:
"[A]ny presumption arising from the general purpose of the acquisition is overcome by the facts that
there was no limitation imposed by the Charter [of the
railroad], the condemnation award did not contain
the language sometimes found in the cases, 'for railroad purposes only', and the land taken was described
by metes and bounds and not as a right of way. * * *
[T]he reference to the quantity and duration of the
interest taken 'as of an absolute estate in perpetuity'3 9
effectually negatives an intention to limit the taking
to an easement."4 0
In each of the three methods of acquisition discussed,
certain elements must be present before a railroad can
acquire right-of-way land in fee simple absolute, namely:
1. Adverse possession must be under color of title.
2. Deeds must be confined to grants of land.
3. Authorizations to acquire a fee simple estate by
eminent domain must be clear, either expressly so
or by necessary implication; and if the authorization is permissive, condemnation awards must be
confined to awards of land.
JoHN 0. DyxuD
Supra, n. 37, 498, "While ... the words 'in perpetuity,' standing alone,

might not be controlling, since they may be used to describe the duration of
a lesser estate, . . we think the phrase 'absolute estate in perpetuity' is
synonymous with 'fee simple absolute'."
,.Supra, n. 37, 502.

